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Abstract: In 1994 the United States extended copyright-like protection to live musi-
cal performances by adopting 17 U.S. C. §1101, which authorizes civil remedies that
are the same as those for copyright infringement, and 18 U.S.C. §2319A, which
subjects violators to fines and prison terms. These new statutes, referred to jointly
as the "anti-bootlegging statute," led to raids of record stores and "sting" operations
aimed at persons involved in the manufacture and distribution of live concert re-
cordings. This Comment argues that the benefit to society of having these live re-
cordings in circulation outweighs the minimal economic damage incurred by the
music industry. Furthermore, the music industry has always had the ability to ad-
dress this perceived problem through non-legal measures, that is by releasing live
concert recordings and thereby eliminating the incentives for unauthorized record-
ing and distribution. Therefore, the statute should be repealed. In its place a legal
regime should be created that recognizes the presumption that fans and royalty-
paying independent record companies have a right to record and distribute record-
ings of live concert performances.
I.
INTRODUCTION
This Comment examines the legal war that the music industry has
waged against "bootlegs," or unauthorized concert recordings, and
recommends a solution that properly balances the interests of both
t The author wishes to thank Professor Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss for patience and
generosity above and beyond the call of duty.
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the public and the music industry. This is not the first Comment to
visit the issue of bootleg recordings.' However, it differs from the
others in many respects. First, virtually all the commentators on the
subject work from the premise that wiping out the bootleg market is,
in and of itself, a worthy goal of public policy. This Comment chal-
lenges that premise. Second, the other commentators generally accept
at face value industry claims that purchases of bootleg recordings are
substitutes for the purchase of legal recordings and, therefore, lead to
huge financial losses to the industry. Conversely, this Comment ar-
gues that bootleg purchases are rarely substitutes for the purchase of
authorized studio albums and, therefore, the losses range from slight
to nonexistent. Finally, while a few of the commentators suggest that
market-oriented responses can be a useful response to bootlegging,
none of them takes this argument to its logical conclusion: that with
market oriented solutions available as a complete answer to unautho-
rized recordings, there is no justification for leaving legal solutions,
particularly those that involve the criminal justice system, on the
books.
Section II defines "bootlegging" and narrows the scope of this
Comment by drawing a distinction between the recording and distri-
bution of live concert performances and other, more odious, forms of
music piracy. Section III examines the state of the bootleg industry,
both as it existed prior to the crackdown of the mid-1990s and as it
exists today. Section IV examines the evolution of the law regarding
the making and distribution of bootlegs. An analysis of the decision in
1 E.g., Susan M. Deas, Jazzing Up The Copyright Act? Resolving The Uncertainties Of
The United States Anti-Bootlegging Law, 20 Hastings Comm/Ent L.J. 567 (1998); David
Schwartz, Strange Fixation: Bootleg Sound Recordings Enjoy The Benefits Of Improving
Technology, 47 Fed. Comm. L.J. 611 (1995); Brian Drobnick, Truckin' In Style Along The
Avenue: How The Grateful Dead Turned Alternative Business And Legal Strategies Into A
Great American Success Story, 2 Vand. J. Ent. L. & Prac. 242 (2000); Robert M. Blunt,
Bootlegs And Imports: Seeking Effective International Enforcement Of Copyright Protec-
tion For Unauthorized Musical Recordings, 22 Hous. J. Int'l L. 169 (1999); Carte P. Good-
win, Live In Concert. . And Beyond: A New Standard Of Contributory Copyright
Infringement, 13 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 345 (1999); Todd D. Patterson, The Uruguay Round's
Anti-bootlegging Provision: A Victory For Musical Artists And Record Companies, 15 Wisc.
Int'l L.J. 371 (1997); Keith V. Lee, Resolving The Dissonant Constitutional Chords Inherent
In The Federal Anti-bootlegging Statute In United States V. Moghadam, 7 Vill. Sports &
Ent. L.J. 327 (2000); Clifford A. Congo, Drawing A Distinction Between Bootlegs And
Counterfeit Recordings And Implementing A Market Solution Towards Combating Music
Piracy In Europe, 17 Dick. J. Int'l. L. 383 (1999); Jerry D. Brown, U.S. Copyright Law
After GATT: Why Chapter Eleven Means Bankruptcy For Bootleggers, 16 Loy. L.A. Ent.
L.J. 1 (1995).
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United States v. Moghadam,2 which upheld the constitutionality of the
anti-bootlegging statute, is included. The language of the Eleventh
Circuit's decision reveals not only the shaky constitutional underpin-
nings of the statute itself, but also the degree to which Congress was
derelict in its duty to understand both its own constitutional grant of
authority and the public interest harmed by the legislation before it.
Also included in this section are case studies of two bootleg record
labels. Section V examines the use of the new statute's criminal provi-
sions to suppress the activities of bootleggers, with special attention
paid to raids conducted on New York City record stores and "Opera-
tion Goldmine," a successful "sting" operation coordinated by the
U.S. Customs Department and the Recording IndustryAssociation of
America ("RIAA"). Section VI examines market-oriented alterna-
tives to using the legal system against bootleggers, focusing on the
strategy employed by the Seattle based rock band Pearl Jam. Finally,
in section VII this Comment concludes by urging that the legal pre-
sumptions regarding the recording and distribution of live concert re-
cordings should be reversed to ensure that these important documents
of music history are readily available to interested parties.
II.
DEFINITIONS
There are three types of product that fall under the general um-
brella of "music piracy": : counterfeit compact discs ("CD's"), pirate
CD's, and bootleg CD's.3 -The definitions of the three categories of
piracy must be clearly articulated because each raises distinct legal is-
sues.4 Failure to adhere to these distinctions is a major weakness of
the literature on the topic: : many of the commentators carelessly
jump back and forth among the categories, sometimes within a single
sentence. 5
2 United States v. Ali Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999), reh'g and reh'g en
banc denied, 193 F.3d 525 (11th Cir. 199), cert denied 529 U.S. 1036, 120 S.Ct. 1529, 146 L.
Ed 2d 344 (2000).
3 Dowling v. United States, 432 U.S. 207 (1985). See also, Kurt Glemser, A History of
Bootlegs, excerpt printed in Hot Wacks Book Supplement 5 4 (1997); Brown, supra note 1,
at 4. See also, industry sources, e.g., British Phonographic Industry ("BPI") at http://www.
bpi.co.uk/flashindexhtml (piracy definitions). Federal statutes refer to all embodiments of
music as "phonorecords" regardless of the medium used. 17 U.S.C.A § 101. However,
because CDs command a dominant share of the current marketplace for "fixed" musical
recordings, the term "CD" will be used throughout this Comment.
4 Brown, supra note 1, at 4. While Brown correctly notes that each type of illegal
recording gives rise to different legal issues, he incorrectly describes the release of unre-
leased studio material ("outtakes") as "piracy" instead of "bootlegging."
5 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 1, at 327, (asserting that the number of "bootlegged" re-
cordings has grown while citing statistics that include counterfeit and pirated discs). Some
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A counterfeit CD mimics an official release and may deceive the
consumer into thinking that she is purchasing a genuine article. 6 To
the greatest extent possible, the counterfeiter will create packaging
that is identical, including trademarks and logos, to the legitimate
release.
7
A pirate CD appropriates copyrighted music in the same fashion
as a counterfeit CD.8 However, no effort is made to mimic the pack-
aging of a legitimate release. 9 Additionally, rather than directly copy
a single release, the pirate may mix music from different sources to
create a "chart toppers" (various artists) or "greatest hits" (single art-
ist) CD.10
A bootleg CD, properly defined, is one that contains unreleased
musical recordings."a The category of bootlegs can be further divided
into studio bootlegs, broadcast bootlegs, and live concert bootlegs.12
Studio bootlegs usually contain tracks recorded in studio that were
either works in progress or simply never included in an official re-
lease. These are often referred to as "outtakes." Most Beatles boot-
legs are of this variety.1 3 Bob Dylan's famous "Basement Tapes" 14
and Elvis Costello's "Kojak Variety"15 project also first entered the
market as studio bootlegs. Broadcast bootlegs are taken from radio
and television broadcasts of live performances. Bruce Springsteen, for
example, broadcast many of his early concerts live over FM radio.1 6
Not surprisingly, they were widely bootlegged.17 In fact, almost any
live broadcast by a major act will quickly find its way into the bootleg
market.18 Finally, there are concert bootlegs. These are recorded
through the concert hall's mixing board, a so called "soundboard" re-
critics believe that the music industry intentionally blurs the distinction between the cate-
gories. Clinton Heylin, Bootleg: The Secret History of the Other Record Industry, 6 (1996).
6 Glemser, supra note 3; Brown, supra note 1, at 4.




11 Id. See also Dowling, supra note 3, at 209.
12 Id.
13 The Beatles are believed to be one of the 5 most bootlegged bands of all time.
Heylin, supra note 5, at 10.
14 The "Basement Tapes" were the source of Great White Wonder, the first commer-
cially successful rock bootleg. Id. at 43-51.
15 Brown, supra note 1, at 25. Brown uses Costello's experience to illustrate the ruth-
lessness of bootleggers. Ironically, Costello was recording an album composed entirely of
obscure songs written by other people. See ELVIS COSTELLO, KOJAK VARIETY
(Warner Bros. Records 1995). While copyrights were violated, they were not Costello's.
16 Heylin, supra note 5, at 135.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 258.
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cording, or, more commonly, by a concertgoer who surreptitiously
records the show with a compact recording device such as a digital
audio tape ("DAT") recorder. 19 Among the shows that established
the viability of the market for live rock concert bootlegs was Bob Dy-
lan's legendary 1966 concert at the Royal Albert Hall.20 Because stu-
dio and broadcast bootlegs raise more difficult legal issues,21 the scope
of this paper will be limited to the creation and distribution of live
concert bootlegs. Therefore, all references to bootlegs or bootlegging
in the remainder of this paper should be read with this limitation in
mind, unless otherwise specified.
III.
THE STATE OF THE BOOTLEG INDUSTRY
As with more traditional industries, the bootleg industry has been
shaped by a number of factors. They include market demand, tech-
nology, and legal environment.
A. The Demand for Bootlegs
The market demand for bootlegs is a reflection of the fact that
live recordings are generally much more interesting than studio re-
cordings. With a studio recording, it can be hard to tell where the skill
of the musician ends and the skill of the producer takes over. Typi-
cally, the various audio tracks are added layer by layer to achieve the
final product, that is, the songs are not recorded "live. '22 The end
result, while perfectly satisfactory for the mass market, often sounds
dull and lifeless to the more demanding ears of serious music fans.23
Conversely, a bootleg recording eliminates the studio engineering and
captures an honest, unvarnished document of the artist's talent.
24
19 See Heylin, supra note 5, at 252-63 (discussing in detail the sources and technologies
used in obtaining concert tapes).
20 Id. at 73-76.
21 In particular, they meet the "fixation" requirement of established copyright law, 17
U.S.C §102. Broadcasts of live concerts are simultaneously "fixed," so it is the copyrighted
broadcast which is bootlegged, not the concert itself, 17 U.S.C. § 101. Studio bootlegs,
unlike concert bootlegs, intrude at a point between the creative process and the reaping of
profit. See infra Section IV-A-1 and text therein. See also Heylin, supra note 5, at 398.
22 Heylin, supra note 5, at 394.
23 Id. at 399. "[I]t is only as a live act that a rock band is in its element."
24 See, e.g., Graham Nash, quoted in Heylin, supra note 5, at 399-400 (noting that boot-
leggers had captured a particular show that was memorable in spite of the fact that David
Crosby was battling the flu at the time).
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Furthermore, bootlegs preserve important moments of musical history
that would otherwise be lost forever.
25
For bootleg collectors, it is the live performance that is the true
measure of musicianship. 26 Therefore, the likelihood that a given act
will be bootlegged is directly proportional to the act's reputation for
excellence on stage.27 The superiority of live music is also reflected in
the music industry's price structure. Taking, for example, a fifteen-
dollar studio CD with fifteen songs, the consumer pays a dollar per
song and may well bring the cost per listen per song down to one cent
over time. By contrast, someone who has paid one hundred dollars
for a concert ticket is expected to hear the songs, say twenty-five of
them, exactly once at a cost of four dollars per listen per song. In this
example the price per listen per song of the live music is 400 times that
of the studio music. The economic appeal of bootlegs is that they al-
low listeners who prefer live music to greatly reduce their cost per
listen. This may lead to the question, raised by one commentator, of
whether bootleg purchases are a substitute for the purchase of concert
tickets.28 This seems highly unlikely given the positive correlation be-
tween ticket sales and bootlegging. Instead the relationship seems to
be that bootlegs enhance the reputation of certain acts and reinforce
ticket sales.29 The superior artistic value of live recordings also raises
the question of why bootleg collectors would continue to buy the stu-
dio releases instead of using bootlegs as substitute purchases. Bootleg
collectors continue to buy the studio recordings for two reasons. First,
a new studio release usually precedes a tour and the fans will buy the
release so that they can learn the songs before hearing them live.
More importantly, the studio version of a song is the "official version"
and serves as the standard against which all other versions will be
measured.
25 Lenny Kaye, in Heylin supra note 5, at 400. "Historical documentation is a very
important thing and I personally know that if it weren't for the Patti Smith Group bootlegs
there would be no live album."
26 Heylin, supra note 5, at 399.
27 Of course, the correlation between bootlegging and live excellence is true with re-
gards to concert bootlegs. Heylin, supra note 5, at 77 (noting the reputation that Led
Zeppelin was "best heard live"). See also, Hot Wacks Supplement #6 (2001) at 27, "every
Led Zeppelin concert was different. Good, bad, long, or short, each was a unique musical
event." This observation applies to all the heavily bootlegged acts except the Beatles, who
could "never cut it live." Heylin, supra note 5 at 399. Consequently, most Beatles bootlegs
are of the studio variety.
28 Brown, supra note 1, at 29.
29 Drobnik, supra note 1, at 256 (noting that circulation of live Grateful Dead record-
ings stimulated ticket demand). See also Heylin, supra note 5, at 108-9 (observing how the
bootleg You Can Trust Your Car to the Man With the Star was instrumental in spreading the
legend of Bruce Springsteen).
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The value of bootlegs in establishing a historical record is evident
on many levels. For example, bootlegs allow fans to document the
evolution of a particular act. Using Elvis Costello as an example, his
1977 debut album My Aim Is True30 was recorded with the backing of
a band named Clover.31 However, shortly after making the album,
Costello formed the band that would back him until 1986 and again
from 1994 to 1996: : The Attractions. 32 The songs from My Aim Is
True sound much different, and arguably much better, with The At-
tractions, rather than Clover, playing them. Also, because Costello
actually toured with The Attractions, but not with Clover, early boot-
legs like Radioactivity33 and Angry Young Sod 34 are far better docu-
ments of the early stage of his career than is My Aim Is True. By the
same token, there are songs that Costello recorded with The Attrac-
tions that he later performed live with the backing of The Confeder-
ates and/or The Rude 5.35 These performances are only available on
bootlegs. Along the same lines, Costello is also an accomplished solo-
ist. However, the only way to access his solo career is through boot-
legs such as I Did Talk To Bob Dylan.36 Another variation on
Costello's live career has been his extensive touring in partnership
with pianist Steve Nieve. In 1996 Warner Brothers released a box set
with live recordings of twenty Costello/Nieve tracks.37 Bootleggers,
on the other hand, have put at least eighty Costello/Nieve tracks into
circulation. 38
Bootlegs also serve to document the evolution of individual
songs. Take, for example, Costello's Green Shirt from the 1979 re-
lease Armed Forces.39 The official version is dark, moody, somewhat
30 ELVIS COSTELLO, MY AIM IS TRUE (Stiff Records 1977).
31 According to the liner notes in a 1993 release of a remastered special edition of My
Aim Is True "the musicians were members of the Marin County band Clover, who could
not be credited at the time due to contractual reasons." ELVIS COSTELLO, MY AIM IS
TRUE (Rykodisc 1993).
32 It Was 20 years Ago Today. BEYOND BELIEF: THE ELVIS COSTELLO
NEWSLETTER, issue #12 (Sept. 1997), at 10.
33 ELVIS COSTELLO, RADIOACTIVITY (Gold Standard).
34 ELVIS COSTELLO, ANGRY YOUNG SOD (Turtle Records 1992).
35 See, e.g., ELVIS COSTELLO & THE CONFEDERATES, DO THE RUMBA
(DGCD).
36 ELVIS COSTELLO, I DID TALK TO BOB DYLAN (Moontunes 1996).
37 COSTELLO & NIEVE, LIVE IN AMERICA (Warner Bros. 1996).
38 For a listing of all songs played live by Elvis Costello and Steve Nieve, see BEYOND
BELIEF: THE ELVIS COSTELLO NEWSLETTER, issues #7 (Aug. 1996), #BB22 (Sum-
mer 1999), #23 (Winter 1999-2000), and #24/25 (Spring 2000) http://www.btinternet.com/
%7Eperrymp/bb/bbhome.htm. For a representative list of Elvis Costello bootlegs, includ-
ing Costello/Nieve bootlegs, see the Elvis Costello Discography at http://www.elviscostello.
info/discography.html.
39 ELVIS COSTELLO, Green Shirt, ARMED FORCES (Stiff Records 1979).
Fall 2002]
176 BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1:169
restrained, and, at 2:42, somewhat short. For the traditional CD buyer
the official version of Green Shirt is definitive. What a pity. The live
version of the song captured on early bootlegs such as I Stand Ac-
cused40 is far more dynamic than the studio version. Furthermore,
Costello reworked the song on his 1996 tour to make it a long (5:00),
slow and utterly desperate plea for mercy.41 Which version of Green
Shirt is best is a debatable proposition. Unfortunately, one has to
commit a felony to participate in the debate.
Clearly, a substantial portion of Elvis Costello's most interesting
material is available only on bootleg.42 Furthermore, between the
"official" and "underground" audio histories of his career, it is the
latter that tells a more honest and complete story. Costello is not
unique in this regard. Pink Floyd worked the individual pieces of
Dark Side of the Moon for years before synthesizing them into an
integrated musical suite. 43 Therefore, the first complete public per-
formance of Dark Side of the Moon would qualify as important rock
history.44 The same could be said for any number of events that have
been captured on bootlegs: : the last Beatles concert, 45 The Who
debuting Tommy 46 or Quadrophenia,47 Costello's last appearance
with The Attractions;48 the list is endless. Bootlegs also capture the
smaller, but historically significant "one time only" events that occur
when an artist has a special guest or dusts off a rarely heard "oldie."
The role that bootlegs play as vessels of history should not be
underestimated. As Allan Kozinn, a music critic for the New York
Times, observed:"from a broader cultural perspective, bootleggers are
doing something crucially important. '49 After discussing the role that
bootleggers have played in historical preservation, he concluded that
bootleggers should be "regarded as cultural heroes, not criminals.
50
Sadly, this perspective was not before Congress when it considered
40 ELVIS COSTELLO, Green Shirt, I STAND ACCUSED (Great Dane Records
1990).
41 For descriptions of Green Shirt provided by various observers of the 1996 tour, see
BEYOND BELIEF: THE ELVIS COSTELLO NEWSLETTER, issue #8/9 (Dec. 1996).
42 See the Elvis Costello Discography, supra note 38.
43 For a description of the evolution of Dark Side of the Moon, see HOT WACKS
BOOK: SUPPLEMENT 5, 11-5 (Hot Wacks Press 1997).
44 Rainbow Theater. (Feb. 1972).
45 Candlestick Park, San Francisco (Aug. 29, 1966).
46 Complete Tommy appears on bootlegs from Sept. 29, 1969. See http://www.thewho.
net/bootlegs/
47 Oct. 28, 1973. See http://www.quadrophenia.net.
48 ELVIS COSTELLO, NOMOREATT7RACTIONS (Oliverecords 1996).
49 Allan Kozinn, Bootlegging as a Public service: No, This Isn't a Joke, N.Y. Times, Oct.
8, 1997, at E2.
50 Id.
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the anti-bootlegging statute. Nor is it evident in the scholarly critiques
of the statute.
B. The Technology of Bootlegs
Technology shapes the bootleg market in three ways: : acquisi-
tion, reproduction, and distribution of the product. It is worth noting
that bootleggers face the same technological challenges, e.g., Napster,
and compact disc-recordable ("CD-R"), as do the record companies.
1. Acquisition Technology
The acquisition of concert recordings has usually been accom-
plished through the use of a secreted tape recorder, though sophisti-
cated bootleggers have on occasion used a radio transmitter to send a
signal to a remote recording location.5 1 Bootleggers may also gain
access to tapes made from a concert hall's mixing board, a so-called
"soundboard" tape.52 The greatest advance in acquisition technology
has been the introduction of DAT.5 3 DAT recorders are compact, eas-
ily concealed, and produce extremely high quality digital recordings
subject, of course, to the acoustics of the concert hall and the skill of
the bootlegger. Because DAT tapes and equipment are quite expen-
sive, it appears that bootlegging is the only practical consumer use of
the technology. 54
2. Reproduction Technology
The reproduction technology available to bootleggers has
changed dramatically with the introduction of CD-R technology.
55
CD-R machines, commonly referred to as "burners," may be stand-
alone devices or, more commonly, are integrated into personal com-
puters as an additional drive.56 CD-R burners make perfect digital
copies from CD's or CD-R's. With CD-R available, bootleggers no
longer have to invest in expensive CD creation equipment. This tech-
nology has also enabled the establishment of smaller bootleg labels
that fill the void in the market left by the elimination of the major
51 For a complete discussion of acquisition technology, see Heylin, supra note 5, at ch.
13.
52 Id. See also Schwartz, supra note 1, at 614.
53 Heylin, supra note 5, at 242. "With DAT, Sony and its partners in design had created
the perfect bootlegging tool." Id.
54 Id. at 246.
55 Blunt, supra note 1, at 172 (noting that the combination of DAT and recordable CD
has had revolutionary impact.
56 Hewlett-Packard computers retailing for less than $1000 as of May 1, 2001, have a
built in CD burner. Personal visit by author to COMPUSA store.
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labels in the late 1990s. 57 As the price of this technology has dropped,
it has also allowed individuals to copy bootleg CD's for re-marketing
or trading.58 This last aspect of CD-R technology is worth noting. Be-
cause it puts the power to reproduce within the hands of individual
collectors, CD-R's would have posed a real threat to the major boot-
leg labels, such as Swinging Pig, Yellow Dog, Kiss The Stone, Great
Dane, etc., even if they had not been snuffed out by the harsh legal
regime of the late 1990s. This is because a CD-R copy of a bootleg
acquired in trade is a perfectly good substitute for the purchase of that
same bootleg.
3. Distribution Technology
In spite of the anti-bootlegging statute, most American cities of
any size have at least one independent record store with bootlegs
mixed in among the wares. However, the Internet is the primary dis-
tribution channel for bootlegs. The closing of the noose around major
Internet bootleg merchants like Kiss The Stone ("KTS") records has
made it more difficult for collectors to find retailers. Nonetheless,
they are out there. The Internet is also the ideal medium for trading
bootlegs. Newsgroups such as alt.music.bootlegs allow bootleg traders
to make contact with like-minded individuals. Likewise, many traders
publish their own websites with lists of available items, desired items,
and trading rules. While, obviously, no hard data is available, it is
likely that more bootlegs currently change hands through trade than
through sales. The receipt of a bootleg in trade apparently qualifies as
"private financial gain" 59 under 18 U.S.C. § 2319A. If so, bootleg
traders are also subject to prison terms and hefty fines.
In addition to facilitating the selling and trading of bootleg CD's,
the Internet allows collectors to obtain bootleg recordings in digital
form. For example, many bootleg tracks have been made available
through the Napster 60 service. Because a person who makes files
available to the public over the Internet does not necessarily receive
consideration in return, the use of Napster for the distribution of
bootlegs would probably only trigger the civil portion of the statute.
Also, as with CD-R's, file-swapping technology might have posed a
57 See discussion of Rocking Horse Records, infra at Sec. IV-C-2.
58 At the newsgroup alt.music.bootlegs, CD-R trading has replaced tape trading as the
method of exchange. For a discussion of the conflict between the RIAA and manufactur-
ers of CD-R drives, see Bootlegger Turning to Burning: RIAA Says CD-R Piracy is on the
Rise, EMEDIA Professional, June 1998 v11 n6 p1l(3).
59 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 defines " financial gain" as "receipt, or expectation of receipt, of
anything of value, including the receipt of other copyrighted goods."
60 http://www.napster.com.
CRIMINALIZATION OF BOOTLEGGING
major threat to the major bootleg labels had they survived beyond
1997.
C. The Legal Climate for Bootlegging
The changing legal climate has altered the bootleg marketplace in
many ways. The largest, most visible, labels are now history.61 How-
ever, smaller "niche" labels continue to thrive.62 The number of boot-
legs exchanged for cash is probably down; the number exchanged for
other bootlegs is probably up. This change may have been inevitable
due to the spread of CD-R. As the quantity of bootlegs in the cash
market has shrunk, prices have been driven up. In many small shops
they now fetch a retail price of thirty to forty dollars. This, ironically
but predictably, has made bootlegging more profitable for the remain-
ing few who continue to engage in it on a commercial basis.
IV.
THE STATE OF THE LAW
It seems intuitively "obvious" that bootlegs are illegal. Yet, sur-
prisingly, the legal status of bootlegs has been a contentious and, until
recently, unsettled issue. This section examines the legal weapons
available in the fight against bootlegging both before and after the
international adoption of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs") 63 and the implementation of
the United States' anti-bootlegging statute.64 Prior to the establish-
ment of this new legal regime, the record companies had to rely on a
porous web of state statutes and common law remedies to control
bootlegging in the United States, and a patchwork quilt of treaties and
national copyright laws to control it on an international level.
A. The Legal Status of Bootlegging Prior to December 8, 1994
Prior to the enactment of the anti-bootlegging statute, federal
copyright law did not extend to the protection of live concerts. 65 The
Sound Recording Act of 197166 had extended copyright protection to
61 See infra Sec IV-B, and text therein.
62 See discussion of Rocking Horse Records, infra at Sec. IV-C-2.
63 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO
Agreement], Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND, VOL. 31; 33 I.L.M. 81(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
64 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (1994) and 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (1994) adopted as part of the Uru-
guay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4973 (Dec. 8, 1994).
65 United States v. Ali Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999), reh'g and reh'g
en banc denied, 193 F.3d 525 (11th Cir. 1999), cert denied 529 U.S. 1036 (2000).
66 Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub.l. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971)
Fall 2002]
180 BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1:169
works fixed under the authority of the author, but not to works that
were unfixed or fixed without authorization. Therefore, legal action
against bootleggers within the United States had to be based upon
some principle of common law or violation of state statute.67 Ameri-
cans could also pursue their interests overseas under the copyright
laws of various countries.
1. Common Law Measures Against Bootlegging
The common law has historically provided scant protection for
musicians who wish to stop bootleggers. Where musicians have
sought protection, it is the doctrine of unfair competition that has
most frequently been invoked. 68 There is also some support for the
view that the unauthorized taping of performances would be a viola-
tion of common law copyright.69 However, neither doctrine is espe-
cially well suited to stemming the flow of bootlegs.
The courts have examined many cases implicating issues of both
copyright and unfair competition. One common thread running
through leading cases such as International News Service v. Associated
Press,70 Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, Inc. et al. v. Wagner-Nichols Re-
corder Corp. et al. ,71 and King v. Mister Maestro, Inc.,72 is that in each
case the defendant was copying material taken from the plaintiff and
using that material to undersell the originator, that is, interfering
"with the normal operation of complainant's legitimate business pre-
cisely at the point where the profit is to be reaped. ' 73 In the context
of bootlegging, where does that point lie? Certainly the unauthorized
fixation of a concert does not in and of itself impair the profitability of
that particular concert. If the fixation itself is not an act of unfair
competition, at what point does the distribution of the unauthorized
product interfere with profits? At the sale of the first copy? The hun-
dredth? What if there are no sales at all, only trades?The Metropoli-
tan Opera court's declaration that "the law of unfair competition does
not rest solely on the ground of direct competitive injury, but on the
67 David Nimmer, The End of Copyright, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1385, 1388 (1995). "Pro-
tection for the performance in the United States typically has been conceptualized as aris-
ing under state law, rather than under federal law." Id.
68 Schwartz, supra note 1, at 626.
69 MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 152 n.5 (2d
ed. 1984-1992), Ch.5,1. "Common law protection may still be available for works falling
outside the scope of the 1976 Act such as works that are not fixed in tangible form." Id.
70 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
71 Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, Inc. v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 101 N.Y.S.2d
483 (Sup.Ct. 1950), affd 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951).
72 King v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F.Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
73 International News 248 U.S. at 240; Metropolitan Opera 101 N.Y.S.2d at 491.
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broader principle that property rights of commercial value are to be
and will be protected. . ,,74 does not negate the necessity of showing
actual injury, it only allows that the injury shown may be indirect. The
party directly injured in Metropolitan Opera was intervening co-plain-
tiff Columbia Records.7 5 In its conclusion the court noted that the
"consideration of irreparable harm to the plaintiffs must necessarily
outweigh the financial loss to defendants resulting from not being able
to appropriate these performances for their own commercial benefit.
•. ."76 Whether a musician whose work has been bootlegged could
show "irreparable harm" is a doubtful proposition.
The application of Metropolitan Opera to the bootlegging context
is problematic for one other reason. On the facts of the case, the
plaintiff, the defendant, or both could have made the opera recordings
available to the public.77 Therefore, weighing only the interests of the
litigating parties was proper. However, in the bootlegging context, the
recordings will reach the public either through the bootlegger or not
at all. Consequently, there would be three interested parties to a
bootlegging case: the musician, the bootlegger, and the public. Apply-
ing to the bootlegging context the observation of the International
News court that "unfair competition in business must be determined
with particular reference to the character and circumstances of the
business" 78 should militate in favor of allowing bootlegging. An un-
taped concert is lost forever, possibly at considerable expense to the
common storehouse of musical history. Yet, no countervailing gain
has been received by any party.
Common law copyright, often referred to as the "right of first
publication, '79 was also an ineffective tool against bootleggers. How-
ever, it is not clear that the doctrine of common law copyright could
ever be used to reach bootlegging. As Michael B. Landau observed:
"The issue gets a bit trickier with respect to sound recordings.
Clearly, the performance of a song is not a publication. But is the
recording of a "'copy"' and its widespread distribution a publication?
Or is a recording more like a performance, albeit captured in time and
74 Metropolitan Opera, 101 N.Y.S. 2d at 492.
75 ld. at 498.
76 Id. at 505. The King court also suggested that "irreparable harm" to plaintiff is the
usual test for judicial intervention (though not applicable on the facts of the case). King,
224 F.Supp. at 108.
77 Metropolitan Opera, 101 N.Y.S. 2d at 486.
78 International News, 248 U.S. at 236. Specifically, the value of news was dependent
on its "novelty and freshness" Id. at 238.
79 Estate of Ernest Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d. 341, 346 (1968).
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in tangible form?" 80 Two other factors complicate the relationship be-
tween common law copyright and bootlegging. First, while common
law copyright provides "the author with perpetual protection until
first publication, ' 81 the music industry itself has long relied on the
proposition that the distribution of records does not qualify as a "pub-
lication. '8 2 The standard practice was to put records into the market-
place and then obtain copyrights on those that sold well.8 3 If sales
made by the record companies were not "publications," it would be
difficult to assert that sales by bootleggers are "publications." There-
fore, the bootlegger does not infringe on the right of first publication.
Second, discussions of common law copyright focus on the question of
whether performance of a song or play serves to "publish" the under-
lying song or script.84 They do not address whether the performance
itself should be protected. How, for example, would the actual per-
formance of a concert be "published"?
Beyond protecting publication rights, common law copyright may
be invoked to protect the reputational interests of an author. 85 How-
ever, the Metropolitan Opera court extracted its iteration of the "right
of exclusive use" from the context of trade mark and trade name
abuse, that is, cases where the consumer is likely to be deceived. 86
However, there is no deception in the marketing of bootlegs: the con-
sumer who believes that she is obtaining a Bob Dylan bootleg almost
always receives one. Additionally, there is no harm to the artist's rep-
utation per se. Indeed, to the extent that bootlegging has any impact
on the reputation df an artist, the impact is more likely to be positive
than negative. 87 In other words, being bootlegged enhances the repu-
tation of a musical act. More importantly, because only the most com-
mitted fans purchase bootlegs,8 8 the target audience has already
resolved any question of reputation in the artists' favor. Because the
circulation of bootlegs causes no fraud on consumers, damage to repu-
tation, or competitive injury, there is no underlying policy objective to
be served by punishing bootleggers under this particular doctrine.
80 Michael B. Landau, "Publication," Musical Compositions, And The Copyright Act of
1909: Still Crazy after All These Years, 2 VAND. J. ENT. L & PRAC. 29, 33-4 (2000).
81 Id. at 31.
82 Id. at 41.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 33 (observing that the principle that performance does not "publish" the un-
derlying work is a well established point of law). See also, King at 107.
85 Metropolitan Opera, 101 N.Y.S. 2d at 494. "The right of exclusive use of one's own
name and reputation has long been recognized by the courts."
86 Id.
87 Heylin, supra note 5, at 64. "And there was still considerable prestige in being boot-
legged." Id.
88 Id. at 408.
CRIMINALIZATION OF BOOTLEGGING
On the whole, common law doctrines appear to be inherently
weak tools to apply against bootleggers. This weakness is com-
pounded by the fact that common law copyright actions must be
brought by the "author" and separate actions, governed by separate
rules, need to be brought in each state.
2. State Anti-bootlegging Statutes
Prior to the enactment of the Federal anti-bootlegging statute,
the musicians and record companies had recourse under various state
anti-bootlegging statutes. 89 State legislatures would not in their nor-
mal course of business have reason to address this "problem," so it is
likely that the state statutes are a direct result of industry lobbying
rather than any anti-bootlegging plea from the general population.
Writing on the anti-bootlegging statute, Professor Lionel S. Sobel
noted the limited utility of the legal responses previously available:
First, using courts and judges to punish bootleggers after the fact
is cumbersome and only occasionally effective. Second, until recently,
the question of whether the law prohibits bootlegging has varied from
state to state and has been surprisingly uncertain. Reliance on the
law, in other words, may have produced disappointing results .... 90
As with common law remedies, the usefulness of the state stat-
utes is compromised by the fact that separate actions must be brought
in each state where violations are alleged to have occurred.
3. International Remedies Prior to the Enactment of the TRIPs
Agreement
The uneven legal environment in the United States prior to the
anti-bootlegging statute, with bootlegs enjoying varying degrees of le-
gality depending upon the location, was a microcosm of the situation
worldwide. The world's major copyright conventions provided pro-
tection against bootlegging that was spotty at best. 91 Furthermore,
bootleggers were free to base their operations in countries with the
most favorable copyright laws.
89 Lee, supra note 1, at 362 n.29. For a complete list of state statutes see id. The stat-
utes vary in their details. For example, the Washington state statute, West's RCWA
19.25.030 (2000), does not appear to reach the possession of bootlegs for personal use.
Also, many of the state statutes have a sliding scale of penalties based on the number of
recordings involved. See, e.g., West's RCWA 19.25.030 (2)(a)(ii).
90 Lionel S. Sobel, Bootleggers Beware: Copyright Law Now Protects Live Musical Per-
formances, But New Law Leaves Many Questions Unanswered, 17 NO.2 ENT. L. REP. 6
(1995).
91 For a general discussion of the international anti-bootlegging regime, see Blunt,
supra note 1.
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Until they were incorporated into the TRIPs agreement, the
Berne Convention and the Rome Convention were the most impor-
tant international expressions of copyright law. 92 Neither was a very
effective tool against bootlegging.
The deficiencies of the Berne Convention are easily explained.
First, it "fails to even address issues of piracy, counterfeiting, and
bootlegging of musical works and recordings. ' 93 Bootlegging is simply
outside the scope of the agreement.
On its surface, the Rome Convention appeared to be a much
more promising vehicle for pressing the battle against bootleggers.
Article 7, Section 1 of the Rome Convention expressly extends to per-
formers the right to protection against "fixation, without their con-
sent, of their unfixed performance (or) the reproduction, without their
consent, of a fixation of the performance. '94 However, in spite of this
promising language, application of the Rome Convention proved to
be problematic.
The greatest enforcement hurdle for the Rome Convention was
the fact that the United States, home to a large portion of the world's
music industry, was not a signatory. 95 The significance of this fact be-
came clear when Germany's Federal Supreme Court was presented
with an opportunity to define that country's obligations under the
Rome Convention.96 The court ruled that a performance by a non-
German national in a country that is not a party to the Rome Conven-
tion would not receive the protection of Germany's copyright laws. 97
This description, of course, applied to almost all concerts held in the
United States: the list of German rock stars is very short.98
Beyond presenting the opportunity to exploit the geographical
origin of certain concert tapes, the Rome Convention also opened a
"protection gap" based upon the date of a concert. Specifically, signa-
tories to the convention could set the term of protection at as low as
twenty years. 99 That was the case in Italy, where live recordings were
given only twenty years protection as opposed to the fifty years
92 Schwartz, supra note 1, at 162.
93 Blunt, supra note 1, atl80.
94 Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms, and Broad-
casting Organisations, October 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 44, 48.
95 Patterson, supra note 1, at 396.
96 Mike Hennessey, Superstar Sets Slip Through Protection Gap in Germany, Billboard,
Aug. 8, 1992, at 1. The test case involved a Bob Dylan concert performed in Italy and
released on an Italian bootleg label. Id.
97 Id.
98 Heylin, supra note 5, at 273.
99 Patterson, supra note 1, at 399.
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granted for studio recordings. 100 Not surprisingly, Italy became a
bootlegging Mecca. 10 1
Bootleggers in Germany and Italy also tested the laws regarding
the payment of "mechanical royalties," that is, compulsory licenses.
10 2
In Italy, for example, bootleggers relied on Article 80 of the Italian
Copyright Act to support the proposition that payment of a royalty
would entitle the bootleggers to copy concert recordings regardless of
the twenty year rule.10 3 Bootlegs manufactured on the basis of this
law carry the SIAE stamp.'
0 4
On the other side of the world, the legal climate in Australia also
proved to be very favorable to bootlegging. 10 5 Specifically, record
companies could only claim copyright protection for concerts they had
recorded and commercially released. 10 6 Lacking copyright protection,
the music companies attempted, unsuccessfully, to convince the courts
that they were being victimized by unfair competition.
07
This discussion of the international legal regime is cursory by de-
sign. Other writers have covered the topic in much greater detail.
The important point is this: on many occasions the bootleggers have
gone to great lengths to ensure that they were operating within the
confines of the law. They litigated their rights in courts of law and
were frequently successful in that litigation.108 Thus, it should be
remembered that the lion's share of the bootlegs now in circulation
were legal at the time and place where they were made.10 9 Therefore,
it was a far from inevitable result that bootlegging would become ille-
gal in virtually all corners of the developed world.
B. The Current Legal Status of Bootlegging
With the incorporation of intellectual property protection into
the framework of the world's international trade regime, the loop-
holes and gray areas that had nurtured the bootleg trade disappeared.
On the international level, all WTO member states are required to
extend intellectual property protection to live musical performances.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id at 400.
103 Id at 399.
104 Id at 400.
105 Glenn A. Baker, Oz Loophole Still Open: Gov't drags feet on live CDs. s. (piracy in
the Australian record industry), BILLBOARD, May 7, 1994 at 57 (discussing piracy in the
Australian record industry).
106 Heylin, supra note 5, at 367.
107 Id. at 367-68.
108 Hennessey, supra note 96.
109 Heylin, supra note 5, at 7.
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Within the United States, all pockets of tolerance for bootlegging
have been eliminated.
1. The TRIPs Agreement
The TRIPs agreement incorporates the so-called Great Conven-
tions of international intellectual property law and, further, moves the
nexus for the settlement of disputes into the realm of trade law, that
is, the WTO.110 Of particular importance to the issue of bootlegging,
the TRIPs agreement gave "teeth" to the Rome Convention by pro-
viding a concrete framework for the settlement of disputes.11 ' The
availability of cross-sectoral relief gives additional leverage to an ag-
grieved party, particularly if it happens to be the United States.11 2
However, pressing a dispute through the WTO's Dispute Resolution
Body requires the significant expenditure of political capital. 13
Therefore, the question of what scale of bootlegging activity would
trigger an official action by the United States is not easily answered.
2. The Federal Anti-bootlegging Statute
Bootlegging became illegal as a matter of federal law on Decem-
ber 8, 1994, with the passage of 17 U.S.C. § 1101 and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2319A as part of the Uruguay Round Agreement Act
("URAA").
114
17 U.S.C. § 1101 provides that anyone who without authorization
of the performers involved "fixes the sounds or sounds and images of
a live musical performance in a copy or phonorecord, or reproduces
copies or phonorecords of such a performance from an unauthorized
fixation" shall be subject to the remedies provided in sections 502
through 505 to the same extent as an infringer of copyright.11 5 The
law also extends to acts of unauthorized transmission to the public of
performances and the distribution, sale, rental, or trafficking of unau-
thorized recordings.' 1 6
The application of the complementary criminal statute, 18 U.S.C.
§2319A, is limited to cases where the violation is committed "know-
ingly and for purposes of commercial advantage or private gain.' 1 7
Prison terms of up to five years for a first offense, ten years for repeat
110 Nimmer, supra, note 67, at 1395-97.
111 Id. at 1392.
112 Id. at 1397, 1417. Cross-sectoral relief means that trade retaliation can take a differ-
ent form than the original dispute.
113 Patterson, supra note 1, at 415-18.
114 Uruguay Rounds Agreement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat.4809 (1994).
115 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(1).
116 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(2),(3).
117 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a).
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offenses, and the statute authorizes fines of up to $250,000.118 Addi-
tionally, equipment and supplies used in the manufacture and/or dis-
tribution of the recordings are subject to forfeiture and destruction. 19
Where the illegal recordings have been imported, they are subject to
seizure and forfeiture under customs laws.
20
The constitutionality of the anti-bootlegging statute was chal-
lenged by one of the defendants snared by "Operation Goldmine,"
the federal government's most conspicuous anti-bootlegging effort. In
United States v. Moghadam, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the stat-
ute.12 1 While the court might have reached the same result through a
different argument, the argument that the court actually made sug-
gests that on its own terms Moghadam was wrongly decided. [their
decision was erroneous???] Furthermore, a reading of the decision
supports the observation that the statute was a "swiftly enacted"' 22
example of "sloppy drafting. ' 12 3 Congress does not seem to have
been well informed on the nature of or the need for the legislation.
a. The Tenuous Constitutionality of the Anti-bootlegging Statute:
Moghadam The contested issue in Moghadam was whether Con-
gress had exceeded its constitutional grant of authority in passing the
anti-bootlegging statute.1 24 The court concluded that while Congress
mistakenly believed that it was operating under Copyright Clause au-
thority, 25 it had, in fact, drawn from the powers granted by the Com-
merce Clause. 126 In short, the court rescued Congress from its own
misapprehension of the law.
There are two characteristics of the anti-bootlegging statute that
exclude it from the grant of authority contained in the Copyright
Clause: ' the statute does not cover "Writings" and it does not protect
them for "Limited Times."
1 27
The scope of the term "Writings" has been subject to gradual ex-
pansion beyond "writing in the literal sense or the lay definition of the
118 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a)(3).
119 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(b).
120 18 U.S.C. 2319A(c).
121 United States v. Ali Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999), reh'g and reh'g en
banc denied, 193 F.3d 525 (11th Cir. 199), cert denied 120 S.Ct. 1529 (2000).
122 Deas, supra note 1, at 570.
123 Patterson, supra note 1, at 411.
124 Id. at 1271.
125 Id. at 1275.
126 Id. at 1282.
127 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." Id.
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word. ' 128 The evolving interpretation of "Writings" led to the even-
tual inclusion in copyright of musical compositions and, in 1971, of
sound recordings themselves. 129 However, the flexibility of the "Writ-
ings" requirement is not unlimited. To meet the requirement one is
required to show both intellectual labor and tangible form or fixa-
tion. 130 Studio bootlegs transgress on material that has already been
fixed. Broadcast bootlegs also involve the appropriation of fixed ma-
terial.131 However, "no respectable interpretation of the word 'writ-
ings' embraces an untaped performance of someone singing at
Carnegie Hall."'1 32 Thus, the extension of protection to unfixed mate-
rial puts the anti-bootlegging statute outside the boundaries of the
Copyright Clause.
133
The "Limited Times" restriction of the Copyright Clause is
straightforward: Congress may not grant indefinite or perpetual pro-
tection to the fruits of intellectual labor. Yet, the anti-bootlegging
statute extends protection indefinitely. 134 This produces the anoma-
lous result that studio and broadcast bootlegs, conceptually a greater
invasion of performer rights, 135 eventually become legal upon the ex-
piration of copyright while a concert bootleg, arguably not a breach of
rights,' 36 stays illegal forever.
The Moghadam court took note of the statute's constitutional in-
firmities by assuming, without deciding, that it was not promulgated
under the authority of the Copyright Clause.137 The court then turned
its analysis to the Commerce Clause to see if that grant of power
might salvage the anti-bootlegging statute.1 38 The fact that Congress
thought it was acting under the Copyright Clause made the court's
task all the more difficult: 139 "predictably there are no legislative find-
128 Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1274.
129 Schwartz, supra note 1, at 624, 627-29. See also Lee, supra note 1, at 335.
130 Lee, supra note 1, at 337.
131 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2001). Live broadcasts are, by definition, simultaneously
"fixed." Id.
132 Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1274, citing Nimmer, supra note 67, at 1409.
133 Nimmer, supra note 67, at 1409. "[1]t must be concluded that this amendment is not
rooted in the Copyright Clause." Id. The Moghadam court decided to assume, without
deciding, that Congressional authority to pass the anti-bootlegging statute was not
grounded in the Copyright Clause. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1274.
134 Deas, supra note 1, at 579.
135 Heylin, supra note 5, at 398 (observing that the means of acquiring outtakes are
more intrusive than those involved in the acquisition of live recordings). Broadcast boot-
legs adversely affect the rights of third parties. See generally, Metropolitan Opera, 101
N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
136 Heylin, supra note 5, at 312.
137 Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1274.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 1275.
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ings in the record regarding the effect of bootlegging live musical per-
formances on interstate or foreign commerce.' 40 Additionally, the
anti-bootlegging statute also lacks the "jurisdictional element as is
commonly found in criminal statutes passed under the authority of the
Commerce Clause.'
41
While the court probably could have made a viable Commerce
Clause argument on behalf of the statute, the argument that it actually
chose to make does not withstand close scrutiny. Specifically, the
court noted the three theories of Commerce Clause authority recog-
nized in United States v. Lopez, that is, "channels of interstate com-
merce,""instrumentalities"of interstate commerce and "intrastate
activities that substantially effect interstate commerce.' u42 The court
decided that bootlegging fell into the third category. 43 This type of
Commerce Clause authority was famously articulated in Wickard v.
Filburn, where it was held that a farmer who grew wheat for home
consumption would not buy wheat in the normal market, thereby de-
pressing commerce. 144 Applying Wickard to bootleggers, the court
concluded that, "[b]ootleggers depress the legitimate markets because
demand is satisfied through unauthorized channels.' a45 Further,
"[t]he very reason Congress prohibited this conduct is because of the
deleterious effect on the recording industry.' 46 Therefore, if bootleg-
gers do not actually "depress the legitimate markets" and there is no
"deleterious effect on the recording industry," the court's entire Com-
merce Clause analysis is voided. Thus, we turn to those issues.
b. The Faulty Underlying Premise of the Moghadam Deci-
sion The underlying premise of the Moghadam decision is that con-
sumers make a choice between buying bootlegs or buying authorized
recordings. If true, the bootleg market would undercut the market for
legitimate releases. This premise also permeated the legislative pro-
cess. The RIAA asserted to a joint session of Congress that the legis-
lation would help curtail "an illicit trade currently generating about
one billion dollars annually.' 47 Law review commentators rarely




143 Id. at 1277.
144 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942).
145 Moghadam, 175 F3d at 1276.
146 Id.
147 Lee, supra note 1, at 357. Lee cites testimony regarding a statutory draft, never
voted upon, with language similar to the anti-bootlegging statute.
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trade. 148 One says bluntly, and incorrectly, that "[e]very dollar spent
on bootleg recordings equals one lost to the music industry. '149 An-
other relies on the following description of bootlegs:
[A] recording of a live performance made without the consent of
the performer. It is easy to make, the costs are minimal, yet the prof-
its can be high. All it involves is attending a live performance, surrep-
titiously recording it, reproducing a master tape, then marketing the
copies. Without protection the performer and the recording company
can suffer substantial loss. Bootleg recordings are usually cheaper be-
cause of lower overhead and are usually of lower quality and sophisti-
cation than legitimately engineered recordings. Their availability
reduces sales of legitimate recordings and can harm the reputation of
the performer and also of the recording company if the recording is
represented as being sold under their label.
150
This last statement is incorrect on almost every point. First, boot-
legs do not compete with authorized releases on the basis of price,
they compete on the basis of content.1 51 Bootlegs do not harm the
reputation of an artist: if the recording is poor the consumer will inva-
riably blame the bootlegger, not the artist.'5 2 Furthermore, bootlegs
are almost never represented as being sold under the record company
label. In fact, the bootlegging industry is highly branded; the bootleg
labels endeavor to create consumer loyalty by producing high quality
recordings.1 53 Also, of course, judgments as to "quality" and "sophis-
tication" are entirely subjective. Of special importance to this paper is
the allegation that bootlegs reduce the sales of legitimate recordings
and cause "substantial loss." This argument is not supportable.15
4
What Congress, the Moghadam court, and the law review com-
mentators apparently fail to recognize is that the people who buy
bootlegs are dedicated, hard core music fans.1 55 They are the very
148 See e.g., Lee, supra note 1, at 357; Congo, supra note 1, at 384; Brown, supra note 1,
at 8-9; Goodwin, supra note 1, at 346.
149 Brown, supra note 1, at 11.
150 ALLISON COLEMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 127-28 (1994), cited
in Deas, supra note 1, at 573.
151 See generally, Alireza Jay Naghavi and Gunther G. Schulze, Bootlegging in the Music
Industry, available at http:helio.unive.it/-icare/magazine/naghavi.htm. Bootlegs from in-
ternet retailers generally retail for between twenty and thirty dollars. Id.
152 See Congo, supra note 1, at 399.
153 See Patterson, supra note 1, at 420 n.160 (discussing the high quality of KTS bootlegs
and the high level brand name identification and consumer loyalty that KTS has received
in return. See generally Heylin, supra note 5, for a discussion of the evolution of bootleg
brand names.
154 See Naghavi and Schulze, supra note 151.
155 See Heylin, supra note 5, at 409 (noting that bootleg trade "presupposes
dedication").
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people who buy all the legitimate releases from a particular artist. 56
The bootleg market presupposes this kind of dedication on the part of
the fans.' 57 As Bruce Springsteen said, "the kids who buy the boot-
legs buy the real records too, so it doesn't really bother me. ' 158 This
sentiment was reiterated years later by Pearl Jam guitarist Mike Mc-
Ready:"I think people that buy bootlegs buy the records anyway. I
was that way."' 159 This fact, that bootlegs complement rather than
compete with authorized releases, completely undermines the conclu-
sion reached by the Moghadam court.
While the record industry has routinely claimed massive losses
due to substitution sales of bootlegs, the economic literature on the
topic has been scarce. That changed with the publication in 2000 of
Bootlegging in the Music Industry, by Alireza Jay Naghavi and Gin-
ther G. Schulze of the University of Konstanz in Germany.1 60 They
concluded that "bootlegging adds to the product mix and does not
necessarily crowd out legal sales. ' 161 Further, "[t]hey (bootlegs) cater
to a small market segment of 'hardcore' fans ignored by the record
companies."'1 62 Industry sales figures also belie the myth that bootlegs
eat into sales of official releases. If true, there would be an inverse
relationship between the availability of bootlegs and the sales of "le-
gitimate" product. In other words, there should be some empirical
evidence that the record industry suffered during the golden age of
CD bootlegs, roughly 1990 to 1995,163 and rebounded thereafter.
There does not appear to be any such evidence.l 64
A final note on Moghadam: one commentator who was very im-
pressed with the decision noted that "[t]he music industry received
what it requested: copyright protection for live musical performances.
The judicial system also received what it wanted: a decision not con-
flicting with two centuries of case law.' 65 Additionally, "[t]he Elev-
156 See Congo, supra note 1, at 399.
157 Id. at 409.
158 Id. at 136. Springsteen later became an outspoken critic of the bootleggers. Id.
159 David Bauder, Band jams market with 25 albums, Sydney Morning Herald ( Sept. 28,
2000.
160 Supra note 152.
161 Id. at 1.
162 Id. at 9.
163 Bob Walker, Then 'til Now, printed in Hot Wacks Supplement 6 (2001), at 4-5 (not-
ing that 1990 to 1995 was the era of the CD bootleg).
164 Author examined 761 items returned from a literature search on "sound industry
profits" from 1990 to 2000. There was no discernable relationship between the severity of
anti-bootlegging laws and the overall health of the music industry. Key factors in the pros-
perity of the music industry seem to be new releases from well-established acts, general
economic conditions, and competition from other types of entertainment, e.g., Japanese
youth spending their entertainment yen cellular phones.
165 Lee, supra note 1, at 362.
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enth Circuit cleverly composed a decision that avoided tortuous legal
brambles to a finale amenable to both sides."'1 66 The fact that the
RIAA and the Eleventh Circuit could be considered "both sides" in
the controversy is indicative of the sad fact that the legitimate inter-
ests of music fans received absolutely no consideration from either
Congress or the court.
c. Other Deficiencies in the Anti-bootlegging Statute Scholars
have noted additional problems with the anti-bootlegging statute.
167
For example, while the Fair Use Doctrine has traditionally been used
to ensure that copyright law does not run afoul of the First Amend-
ment, there is no Fair Use defense against the anti-bootlegging stat-
ute. 168 Therefore, the statute might be vulnerable to a challenge on
First Amendment grounds. The statute's silence on the applicability
of the Work For Hire doctrine may also prove to be a regrettable
oversight. 169 Of course, the biggest unresolved issue in the wake of
Moghadam is whether the Copyright Clause still acts as a meaningful
limitation on Congressional power.
70
When the anti-bootlegging statute and the uninformed actions of
Congress and the Eleventh Circuit are taken together, a disturbing
picture emerges. A powerful industry that is failing to serve a small
but important market has managed to criminalize the behavior of peo-
ple who do serve that market. That is why the statute should be re-
pealed. By way of analogy, consider the way the major automobile
manufacturers could respond to the proliferation of motorcycles. The
argument that motorcycle sales are substitutes for automobile sales is
at least as strong as the argument that bootlegs are substitutes for stu-
dio releases. It might be expected that the automobile makers would
either decide to compete in the motorcycle market or concede the
market to motorcycle specialists. The third option would be for the
industry to use its political clout to persuade a gullible Congress to
ban the manufacture and use of motorcycles. That is exactly what
happened to the bootleg industry. The fact that so many music indus-
try insiders are also bootleg collectors 171 only confirms the moral
bankruptcy of the process that produced the statute.
166 Id. (emphasis added).
167 See generally Sobel, supra note 90.
168 Id. at 9. See also Deas, supra note 1, at 580; Nimmer, supra note 67, at 1400.
169 Deas, supra note 1, at 599-607.
170 Nimmer, supra note 67, at 1411-12.
171 See Heylin, supra note 5, at 62 (noting that Rolling Stones Mick Jagger and Keith
Richards were avid bootleg collectors). See also Bauder, supra note 159 (McReady admits
to owning 100 bootlegs of bands other than his own).
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C. Case Studies: Two Important Bootleg Labels
Having established the contours of the market for bootlegs, we
now turn our attention to an examination of the typical actors in that
market. KTS Records exemplified the potential for an independent,
quality-minded, royalty-paying record company to serve the market
for live music. Its death knell was sounded by the passage of the anti-
bootlegging statute and the subsequent crackdown known as Opera-
tion Goldmine. At the other end of the bootleg spectrum is Rocking
Horse Records ("RHR"), a small niche label catering primarily to
Elvis Costello collectors.
1. KTS Records
KTS Records was established in 1991 in the Republic of San Ma-
rino, Italy.172 At the time, Italy offered one of the most favorable
legal environments in Europe for the production of bootlegs. 73 By
obtaining high quality source tapes and releasing CD's with crystal
clear sound, KTS managed to achieve a high level of brand name rec-
ognition and customer loyalty. 74 By the time of its demise, KTS had
released close to seven hundred titles by an impressive variety of art-
ists. 175 Its final catalog, published in 1996, was a full color, thirty-two
page celebration of live music. 176 Its best marketing tool, though, was
its website at http://www.kts.it. It allowed collectors to browse the cat-
alog and obtain detailed information about each recording.
The scale of success enjoyed by KTS would seem to support re-
cord industry arguments that bootlegging eats into its legitimate mar-
ket share. However, even an operation of KTS's size was unlikely to
cut into the sales of studio releases. What casual fan would bother to
track down the KTS website? Furthermore, casual listeners like their
music safe and predictable. 177 Bootlegs are too raw for their tastes. 178
Additionally, bootleg runs are generally in the low thousands per ti-
tle; 179 a veritable drop in the bucket compared to the overall size of
172 KTS Records Catalog #8 (1996), on file with author.
173 See Heylin, supra note 5, at 325-37. See also Patterson, supra note 1, at 399-400.
174 Id. at 420 n.160.
175 KTS Records Catalog #8, supra note 172.
176 Id.
177 See Heylin, supra note 5, at 411.
178 Dieter Schubert, quoted in Heylin, supra note 5, at 278.
179 Kurt Glemser, A History of Bootlegs, excerpted in Hot Wacks Supplement #6, at 4
(estimating runs of 500 to 1000 per title in 1985). Some bootlegs are produced in larger
quantities, others have smaller runs. See also Hennessey, supra note 96 (estimating runs of
1,000 to 3,000 per title in 1992).
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the music market.180 The truth is that the record companies could
have coexisted peacefully with KTS. It was serving a market they con-
sidered unimportant.
The implementation of the TRIPs agreement closed the various
gaps in European intellectual property law and one by one the major
bootleg labels began to close their doors.181 KTS was one of the last
survivors. Its demise became inevitable with the enforcement of the
anti-bootlegging statute. Two principals of KTS, Georgio Serra and
Caroline Albanese, were indicted in absentia on March 31, 1997, as
part of Operation Goldmine. 182 Shortly thereafter, the following no-
tice appeared on the KTS website: "Official Notice: the End of An
Era. KTS records are sorry to announce that they will be closing
down from the end of April '97. This is the last chance to get the best
live CDs in the world at the lowest possible prices.' 8 3 It was indeed
the end of an era. The name and back catalog were eventually sold to
interests in Singapore. The new owners released a few poorly engi-
neered titles and the label quickly sank into obscurity.
2. RHR
RHR is typical of the labels that have managed to bring high
quality recordings to the market even in the strict legal environment
of the late 1990s. The combination of DAT and CD-R technology has
made it practical for RHR to produce small runs of each of its re-
leases.184 For example, the Elvis Costello bootlegs Tempted to Spit 185
and Legends and History Collide186 were "strictly limited to 50 copies"
and for "fan club use only. 1' 87 Of course the original fifty copies of
each have multiplied on CD-R burners over the years as they have
been used as trading currency. The number extant worldwide is prob-
ably in the low hundreds for each release.
180 See, e.g., Heylin, supra note 5, at 323 (comparing sales of 5,000 Springsteen bootlegs
to sales of ten million copies of Born in the U.S.A.).
181 See, e.g., John Carr, Black Friday, Hot Wacks Supplement #5, at 23.
182 Press release from the United States Department of Justice and the Recording In-
dustry Association of America (Mar. 31, 1997)[hereinafter Press Release], reprinted in Hot
Wacks Supplement #5 at 27. KTS officials were targeted in the "sting" operation but were
not present. Going Underground, ICE - THE MONTHLY CD NEWSLETTER , (May
1997), excerpted in Hot Wacks Supplement #5, at 28.
183 Going Underground, supra note 182.
184 Bob Walker, Then 'til Now, Hot Wacks Supplement #6 (2001), at 5 (noting the emer-
gence of small labels to fill the gap left by the demise of the giants).
185 ELVIS COSTELLO, TEMPTED TO SPIT (Rocking Horse Records 1997).
186 ELVIS COSTELLO, LEGENDS AND HISTORY COLLIDE (Rocking Horse
Records 1997).
187 Artwork from Tempted to Spit and Legends and History Collide, on file with author.
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RHR appears to have released twenty-four discs of live Elvis
Costello concert material. 188 Assuming a price of twenty-five dollars
per disc and fifty copies released of each one, RHR has generated
$30,000 in sales. The contribution that RHR has made to the docu-
mentary record of Costello's career is arguably worth much more than
that. Furthermore, there's not much chance that RHR's activities
have cost Costello or his record company a penny. Anyone who
would go to the trouble of tracking down RHR material is certainly in
possession of all the official material. In spite of this, anyone con-
nected with RHR is a felon in the eyes of the law.
V.
LEGAL ACTION UNDER THE ANTI-BOOTLEGGING STATUTE
At its core, the anti-bootlegging statute is public law passed for
private benefit. The recording industry has used its considerable po-
litical clout to criminalize behavior that, on balance, serves a legiti-
mate public purpose and, furthermore, can be controlled privately by
the record companies themselves. The benefits of this arrangement
flow to the record companies who receive market protection beyond
that contemplated by the framers of the Constitution and a supply of
free labor from police, prosecutors, and Customs agents. 18 9 The costs
are borne by society at large in the form of scarce law enforcement
assets diverted to unnecessary anti-bootlegging operations and re-
duced access to historically and aesthetically important recordings of
live music.
Having the criminal justice system at its disposal allowed the re-
cord industry to step up its campaign against bootleggers. In July of
1996, New York City's Greenwich Village saw large scale busts remi-
niscent of the Prohibition Era. "[Alt Revolver Records on 8th Street,
uniformed cops and FBI agents broke down the door."' 190 This was
part of the "biggest week of bootleg seizures in history."'191 At the
conclusion of the raids, "(New York State Attorney General) Vacco
188 ELVIS COSTELLO with STEVE NIEVE, JAPAN TOUR 1999 VOL.3 (Rocking
Horse Records 1999) is identified as RH 023/024, presumably the 23rd and 24th discs
released.
189 Congo, supra note 1, at 394 (noting the record industry's incentive to prefer enforce-
ment through the criminal justice system).
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declared lower Manhattan safe from unauthorized concert
recordings."
'192
Vacco's comments at a postbust news conference revealed that
New York State's top law enforcement officer was badly misinformed
about the nature of the crime he was fighting. "People are being
ripped off by the people running this shop. They are paying top dollar
for these knockoffs, but they are not getting top quality."' 93 In other
words, Vacco represented, falsely, that he was acting to protect the
interests of exploited, vulnerable consumers, not the interests of the
RIAA.194 Furthermore, describing bootlegs as "knockoffs" is simply
incorrect: that label should only be used in connection with counter-
feit CD's. 195 Finally, much of the inventory carried by Revolver
Records was, indeed, top quality.
1 96
At this point two questions are worth asking. First: on whose be-
half were these raids made? Second: is the battle against bootlegs a
legitimate use of the criminal justice system? Of course, a third ques-
tion is: why aren't the first two questions ever asked?
An even greater abuse of the criminal justice system occurred the
following year. On March 14, 1997, Operation Goldmine culminated
in the arrest and indictment of thirteen persons for violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2319A. 197 Not surprisingly, given the anti-bootlegging stat-
ute's status as a tool of private criminal justice, the RIAA and the
Department of Justice issued a joint press release. 198 The operation
was described as "a year-long undercover operation conducted by
agents of the United States Customs Service, with the assistance of the
RIAA. . ." and "the largest criminal bootlegging investigation of its
kind." 199
On its own terms Operation Goldmine was clearly a success. It
led to the closure of several prominent bootleg labels including
KTS.200 Additionally, it put an entire industry "on notice." Many
192 Id. Shortly after Congress passed the anti-bootlegging statute, New York State made
bootlegging a felony. Kozinn, supra note 49. Thus, the spokesperson for the raids hap-
pened to be a state, rather than federal, official.
193 Kozinn, supra note 49.
194 See Heylin, supra note 5, at 276 (noting that bootleg buyers were "always among the
best informed of music fans").
195 Kozinn, supra note 49.
196 The author has one bootleg from Revolver Records. It was legally manufactured
and is of the highest quality.
197 See Press Release, supra note 182. See also, Paul Farhi, CD Bootleggers Face the
Music; Supply of Illegal Recordings Shrinks After Customs Crackdown, The Washington
Post, July 14, 1997, at Al.
198 Press Release, supra note 182
199 Id.
200 See Going Underground, supra note 182.
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bootleg sellers sold their remaining stock and left the business.201
However, even more than the busts of Greenwich Village record
stores, it raises the question of how, and for whom, valuable taxpayer
assets are being used. How much does a "year-long undercover oper-
ation" cost? How many hundreds of attorney hours were expended in
arranging the ultimate plea-bargains? Most importantly, could not
these assets have been better spent elsewhere? At that particular
time, were there no greater threats to the safety and welfare of
America's citizens than those posed by bootleg CD's?
In addition to being ethically unjustifiable, Operation Goldmine
was simply unnecessary. First, the record industry could have driven
the bootleggers out of business by making a conscious decision to
serve the live music market.20 2 Furthermore, the operation was con-
ducted at exactly the point in time where the shifting sands of technol-
ogy were likely to swallow up the major bootleg labels. This is
because in early 1997 the CD-R was emerging as a viable copying
technology. As one industry observer put it, "[m]ere months after the
Florida bust appeared to put an end to Europe's big bootleg labels
and the importation of most CD's into the country, CD-R bootlegs
are booming, turning up like never before. '20 3 Labels like KTS would
have been extremely susceptible to market destruction caused by CD-
R copying. In other words, the targets of Operation Goldmine were
already living on borrowed time: they probably would have been out
of business by 1998 regardless of the law enforcement campaign
against them.
VI.
A MARKET-ORIENTED RESPONSE TO BOOTLEGGING
As an alternative to wielding the criminal justice system against
bootleggers, the music industry should pursue the far more ethical
course of eliminating the incentive for the activity. This could be eas-
ily accomplished by systematically recording concerts and selling the
CD's at reasonable prices.
The music industry has historically shown only sporadic interest
in preempting the market for live recordings. The first successful mar-
keting counter attack against a bootleg was apparently Apple Re-
cord's 1969 thrust against a Beatles bootleg entitled Live Peace in
201 Id.
202 See, e.g., Torsten Hartmann, quoted in Hennessey, supra note 96, "Why don't they
release live material by their artists on cheap cassettes? If they did they could put us out of
business."
203 Going Underground, ICE - THE MONTHLY CD NEWSLETTER (July 1997), re-
printed in Hot Wacks Supplement #5, at 30.
Fall 2002]
198 BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1:169
Toronto.20 4 Frank Zappa notoriously fought back against the bootleg-
gers by acquiring a collection of bootlegs and marketing them as a ten
disc (vinyl) box set entitled Beat the Boots!2 0 5 Others have taken ma-
terial that was long available in the bootleg market and released it on
official record labels, usually with excellent results. Bob Dylan's 1966
Royal Albert concert delighted bootleg fans for thirty years before
Columbia Records finally made an official release of the same con-
cert.20 6 It sold well.20 7 Two successful collections of Beatles rarities,
Anthology] and 11, also featured material that had been long availa-
ble in the bootleg market.
20 8
The bootleggers themselves have long been aware that the record
companies could squeeze them out of the market. As one said: "they
(the record companies) could just put us out of business. '20 9 Com-
mentators have also noted that "flooding the market with live music"
would rob the bootlegs labels of their raison 'd'tre.
Given the availability of a strategy that does not require the
breaking down of doors or lengthy, expensive undercover operations,
the record companies should have the power of the criminal justice
system removed from their list of available options. Furthermore, in-
sisting on market-oriented solutions would create a win-win-win situa-
tion. Musicians would win in the form of greater sales and higher
revenues. Collectors would win in the form of a wealth of concert
recordings. And taxpayers would win because they would no longer
be forced to subsidize private justice.
A. Case Study: Pearl Jam
The popular Seattle based rock band Pearl Jam was the first to
test the limits of a comprehensive anti-bootlegging marketing strategy.
The spectacular results of Pearl Jam's campaign make it obvious that
the anti-bootlegging statute is unnecessary.
Pearl Jam appeared on the music scene with the release of its first
album, Ten, in 1991.210 Ten was a huge commercial success with over
9 million copies sold.211 Subsequent Pearl Jam releases also sold well.
Beyond its commercial appeal, Pearl Jam also established a reputation
204 See Heylin, supra note 5, at 58.
205 Id. at 394-95.
206 BOB DYLAN, LIVE 1966 (Columbia Records 1998).
207 See, e.g., Jan DeKnock, Bob Dylan's 1966 concert recording is the week's top-debut-
ing CD, The New Times Music News (Oct. 28, 1998), available at http://www.newstimes.
com?archive98/oct3098?mud.htm.
208 Congo, supra note 1, at 401.
209 See supra, note 202.
210 See Pearl Jam page at http://www.wallofsound.go.com/artists/pearljam/home.html.
211 Id. at 3.
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for putting on scintillating live shows and quickly became a favorite of
bootleggers. 212 Indeed, almost every pre-2000 Pearl Jam show has
been bootlegged.
213
In 2000, prior to embarking on a tour of Europe and North
America, Pearl Jam made a proposal to Sony Records: Pearl Jam
would record all of its concerts and release them on CD. The label
reluctantly assented. 214 Kelly Curtis, the band's manager, explained
the motive behind the unique marketing campaign:"[o]ur hope is to
provide fans who are currently buying high-priced bootlegs with an
alternative.
215
Pearl Jam was already in the habit of taping its live shows, so the
"bootleg" project did not add any additional expense to the tour it-
self.216 The recordings were extracted from the soundboard at each
venue where the band played. 217 Also, where "live" albums released
by the studios are often heavily engineered, the Pearl Jam "boots"
have the raw sound associated with unofficial bootlegs. 21 8 In an inter-
esting twist, the Pearl Jam releases also look like bootlegs. 219 The Eu-
ropean leg of the tour was released in plain brown cardboard
packaging with the track listings apparently stenciled in smudgy ink.
220
The name of the record company does not appear on the label. 221 Nor
are the usual copyright warnings anywhere to be found in the packag-
ing or on the discs. 222 The North American releases have similarly
rustic packaging: the only difference is that the cardboard packages
(no jewel boxes) are gray in color.
223
212 Polly Anthony, President of Epic Records, "breaking chart records...is not surpris-
ing because Pearl Jam is one of the most heavily bootlegged and best live bands of our
time." quoted in SONICNET.COM, Pearl Jam's Five Chart Debuts Set Billboard Record,
available at http://www.sonicnet.com/artists/ai-singlestory.jhtml?id=112.... (Feb 26, 2002).
213 See Robert Hilburn, Pearl Jam releases its 'own bootlegs' at low cost, Los Angeles
Times, (Sept. 27, 2000).
214 See Bauder, supra note 159.
215 WWW.ADDICT.COM, Pearl Jam Releasing Entire Euro Tour on CD, formerly
available at http://www.addict.com/MNOTWlofi/.
216 See Bauder, supra note 159.
217 WWW.ADDICT.COM, Pearl Jam Releasing Entire Euro Tour on CD, formerly
available at http://www.addict.com/MNOT'W/lofi/.
218 See Robert Hilburn, Pearl Jam "Jams and Jams and Jams. Los Angeles Times,
(Sept. 27, 2000).
219 See, e.g.,WALLOFSOUND.COM, Pearl Jam Domestic Bootlegs: Second Leg,
formerlyavailable at, http://www.wallofsound.go.com/reviews/stories/pearljamdomestic
bootlegssecondleg/index.html.
220 PEARL JAM 29 6 00 (Epic Records 2000), on file with author.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 PEARL JAM, SEATTLE WASHINGTON NOVEMBER 6 2000 (Epic Records
2001)
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At first the "bootlegs" were offered for sale exclusively through
the websites for Pearl Jam fans at http://www.pearljam.com and http://
www.ten.com. 224 Eventually the circle of distribution was expanded to
include traditional retailers such as Tower Records. 225
On October 4, 2000, Pearl Jam made rock and roll history by si-
multaneously debuting five albums on Billboard Magazine's Top 200
albums chart.226 Shows from Katowice (#103), Milan (#125), Verona
(#134), London (#137) and Hamburg (#175) made the list.227 Eventu-
ally, twelve of the European shows would make it into Billboard's Top
200.228 In March 2001, the twenty-four North American shows were
released. As of May 2001, total sales of the Pearl Jam official bootleg
series had topped 2 million units. 229 Perhaps the ultimate indicator of
the market demand for these live recordings is the fact that mega-
retailer Costco has large bins of the CD's marked at $10.98 for a two
disc set.2
30
At first glance, the massive success of Pearl Jam's "bootleg" pro-
ject would appear to contradict the assertion that the market for boot-
legs is small and specialized. However, it would be unrealistic to
assume that in the absence of the Pearl Jam live releases the bootleg-
gers would have sold 2 million units. Prior to 1995, bootleg runs were
generally in the low thousands per title.231 They have, of course, been
even smaller since then.2 32 Even assuming a favorable legal environ-
ment for bootlegging, the entire tour would probably have led to the
production of less than 100 thousand two-disc sets. Thus, 2 million
units is not the market that bootleggers could have exploited. Rather,
1.9 million units is the market that, under normal circumstances,
would have been suppressed.
The major bootleg labels may not have survived the CD-R boom
of the late 1990s. They certainly would not have survived the wide-
spread adoption of Pearl Jam's marketing strategy. The Pearl Jam ex-
perience makes it clear that the bootleg "problem," to the extent that
it is a problem, is one that the music industry has brought upon itself.
The most ethical and effective solution to the problem is also well
224 WWW.ADDICT.COM, Pearl Jam Releasing Entire Euro Tour on CD, formerly
available at http://www.addict.com/MNOTW/lofi/
225 Id.
226 See SONICNET.COM, supra note 212.
227 Id.
228 WALLOFSOUND.COM, supra note 219
229 Id.
230 Issaquah, Wash. Costco, visited by author May 15, 2001.
231 See supra note 179, and text therein.
232 See, Walker, supra note 163.
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within the industry's sphere of competence. The continued presence
of the United States government in this field is simply unacceptable.
VII.
CONCLUSION
At its inception the anti-bootlegging statute was a corrupt and
black-hearted piece of legislation. It has not been redeemed by the
passage of time. Indeed, recent developments have only served to
emphasize the fact that application of the statute has constituted an
abuse of the criminal justice system. It should be repealed immedi-
ately. Concert tapers should be allowed to operate openly and, in the
absence of marketing by a particular artist, freely distribute the fruits
of their efforts subject to the proviso that commercial bootleggers
would pay royalties.
It is tempting to seek a doctrinal construction that would support
this new legal paradigm. For example, there is a supportable proposi-
tion that a concert performer, by the mere act of publicly performing
it, puts a particular performance into the public domain. Given the
historical importance of bootlegs, Fair Use doctrine could be reasona-
bly argued as a justification for repealing the statute. A First Sale
doctrine could be created that recognizes a concertgoer as a legitimate
"first buyer" with rights of her own. However, since the anti-bootleg-
ging statute itself has no doctrinal foundation, it is probably unneces-
sary to articulate a basis for not having the statute on the books.
The approach recommended by this Comment does not represent
a general assault on copyright. Musical artists have important rights
that should be protected by law. However, the law should strike a
balance between the incentive value of the monopoly conferred and
the price imposed on the public. As protection becomes both broader
and tighter, it eventually crosses over the line that separates good pol-
icy from bad. The anti-bootlegging statute has crossed over that line.
A skilled songwriter can reap huge financial rewards from the copy-
right of a song and the copyright of a studio recording of that song.
There is no additional incentive created by making each additional
performance of the song an independently copyrightable event. In-
deed, doing so is against the public interest.
At least one observer believes it is the incentive to perform con-
certs themselves, rather than the incentive to produce new creative
works, that justifies the existence of the anti-bootlegging statute.2
33
She wrote that"the United States stands to benefit from the enjoy-
ment of a fuller range of musicians' and other performers' talent in
233 Deas, supra note 1, at 633-34.
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live performances... ,234 If by this she meant that artists who had
avoided the United States because their live performances were not
protected here would now feel free to tour, the statement is simply not
supportable. There was no surge in touring activity after the passage
of the statute. In fact, there is no evidence that any artist has ever
declined to do concerts in the United States because of the "danger"
posed by bootlegging. If, on the other hand, the commentator meant
that the "enjoyment of.. .talent in live performances" is a worthwhile
objective of the legislative process, the anti-bootlegging statute works
against that goal rather than for it. The anti-bootlegging statute
clearly suppresses the enjoyment of live music.
The war against bootlegs is over. As the Pearl Jam experience
demonstrates, the record companies have won complete and total vic-
tory. Having triumphed, the industry should do the honorable thing
and beat a gracious, orderly retreat.
234 Id.
